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Lear: Lear: Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising

The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the
Age of Direct Consumer Advertising
Doe v. Alpha TherapeuticCorp.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally drug manufacturers have been excused from the general duty
to warn consumers about the risks associated with their products by the learned
intermediary doctrine.2 Though the doctrine has a sound grounding in public
policy, drug companies have recently employed marketing strategies that
undermine the usefulness of the learned intermediary rule. In Doe v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri recently addressed whether the learned intermediary doctrine can be
used as a defense when a drug company markets a product directly to
consumers. This Note discusses the learned intermediary defense and its
applicability to drug companies that engage in direct-to-consumer advertising.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. was a consolidated lawsuit brought by
hemophiliac patients against a pharmaceutical company As part of their
treatment, the plaintiffs were regularly prescribed Factor VIII concentrate
manufactured by Alpha Therapeutic Corporation ("Alpha Therapeutic").' At
various times, the plaintiffs were diagnosed as HIV-positive and later contracted
AIDS.5 The evidence demonstrated that in a newsletter sent to Factor VIII
concentrate users in the summer of 1983, Alpha Therapeutic reported that it had
"stepped up efforts to protect hemophilia patients from AIDS."' The newsletter
also noted that scientists had uncovered evidence that suggested AIDS was not
necessarily associated with blood or blood products, even though by the summer
of 1983, in the words of the court, "it was clear that AIDS was transmitted
through blood and that hemophiliacs were being exposed to' 7the disease through
contaminated blood products used to treat their condition.

1. 3 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
2. For an explanation of the learned intermediary doctrine, see infra Part III.A.
3. Alpha Therapeutic,3 S.W.3d at 406-07.
4. Id. at 408. Hemophilia is a genetic disease characterized by a deficiency in
Factor VIII, a protein that aids blood in clotting. Because hemophiliacs do not have
Factor VIII, their blood cannot clot and therefore they are unable to control
hemorrhaging. Factor VIII concentrate is manufactured by drawing blood from donors,
extracting the Factor VIII protein and concentrating it. Id. at 407.
5. Id. at 408.
6. Id. at409.
7. Id.
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On December 1, 1997, a consolidated jury trial was held in which the
plaintiffs alleged, in pertinent part, that Alpha Therapeutic failed to adequately
warn the plaintiffs about the risk of contracting AIDS through the use of Factor
VIII concentrate.8 Alpha Therapeutic denied the existence of a duty to warn,
alleging that the plaintiffs' doctors were learned intermediaries who were
knowledgeable of Factor VIII and its risks, and therefore, Alpha Therapeutic
could rely on the doctors to warn their patients.9
At trial, the court admitted evidence as to the extent of information
regarding HIV and AIDS received by the plaintiffs from their respective
doctors." The plaintiffs' doctors never specifically warned them that the Factor
VIII concentrate they were taking could cause AIDS." However, there was
some evidence that at least one of the plaintiffs' doctors had printed material in
his office that contained warnings that AIDS was likely transmitted through
blood and blood products, such as Factor VIII concentrate.' 2 Evidence also
suggested that even though the medical profession did not, at the time, have a
clear understanding of AIDS, at least one of the plaintiffi' doctors was aware of
studies that indicated the risks associated with Factor VIII concentrate and had
knowledge of a trend among doctors of removing their patients from the
treatment. 3
Alpha Therapeutic presented evidence that at the time of the plaintiffs'
infection with AIDS, the National Hemophilia Foundation recommended that
doctors continue to use the existing treatment methods (including Factor VIII

concentrate) because the cause of AIDS was still unclear. 4 There was also
evidence suggesting that the general consensus of the medical profession, at the
time, was that AIDS was transmitted through blood and blood products.' 5
Moreover, as early as 1981, Alpha Therapeutic had begun researching methods
for heat-treating Factor VIII concentrate to rid it of viruses. 16
By the summer of 1983, "it was clear that AIDS was transmitted through
blood and that hemophiliacs were being exposed to the disease through
contaminated blood products used to treat their condition."' 7 This view was
widely accepted when Alpha Therapeutic sent its Summer 1983 newsletter to the
patients using its products. The newsletter reported that Alpha Therapeutic had
increased its efforts to protect hemophilia patients from AIDS, but noted that

8. Id. at 410.
9. Id. at411.
10. Id. at 415-18.
11. Id.
12. Id. at415-16.
13. Id. at 416.

14. Id. at417.
15. Id. at416.
16. Id. at 417.

17. Id. at 409.
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there was evidence that AIDS was not necessarily related to blood or blood
products. 8
At the close of evidence, the trial court submitted an instruction to the jury
on the learned intermediary doctrine. 9 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Alpha Therapeutic. 0 On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged, in pertinent part, that the
trial court erred in submitting an instruction on the learned intermediary doctrine
to the jury because such an instruction was not supported by Missouri law or the
facts at issue in the case.2 ' The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District of Missouri upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that there
was sufficient evidence to support the instruction on the learned intermediary
doctrine because the treating physicians were aware of the risk of contracting
AIDS associated with the use of Factor VIII concentrate, and that Alpha
Therapeutic's failure to warn was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the LearnedIntermediaryDoctrine
In 1966, the term "learned intermediary" was coined by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in SterlingDrug,Inc. v. Cornish.' In Sterling Drug, the court
found that a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn at least a patient's doctor of
the risks associated with the use of its product. 4 The court reasoned that because
the patient's doctor could act as a learned intermediary, a warning by the
pharmaceutical company to the doctor had a good chance of preventing harm to
the plaintiff.25 In SterlingDrug, the drug manufacturer advocated placing the

18. Id.
19. Id. at 418. The text of the instruction read:
On the claim of plaintiff Jim [John, James and Carol] based on failure to use
ordinary care to adequately warn of the risk of harm from AIDS, your finding
must be for defendant if you believe Jim's treating physician, Dr. Andrew
Weiss [Dr. John Bouhassin], was aware of the information that should have
been provided to plaintiff concerning the risk of contracting HIV from the use
of factor concentrate.

Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 419.
22. Id. at421.
23. 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966); see Catherine A. Paytash, The Learned

IntermediaryDoctrineand PatientInserts: A BalancedApproach to PreventingDrugRelated Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1345 n.6 (1999).

24. Sterling Drug,370 F.2d at 85.
25. Id.
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duty to warn solely on the treating physician.26 The manufacturers argued that
the physician's failure to keep up with the medical literature, including
information regarding the risks of the drug in question, was an intervening
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and should relieve the drug company of
liability.27 The Eighth Circuit dismissed this argument, holding that the
pharmaceutical manufacturer had a positive duty to inform the doctor of the risks
associated with its product and that the drug manufacturer's breach of its duty
to warn was sufficient for it to be held liable regardless of the doctor's failure to
independently warn the patient.28
The court in Sterling Drug used the concept of the doctor as a learned
intermediary between drug manufacturers and patients as a justification for
imposing a duty on drug manufacturers to warn doctors of the risks of their
products. Since SterlingDrug,however, the learned intermediary concept has
been employed by drug manufacturers as a defense from being held liable to
warn patients directly of the risks associated with their products.
The learned intermediary defense has been widely adopted under various
rationales. The predominant rationale for the learned intermediary defense was
explained in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories."S In Reyes, the Fifth Circuit explained
that the learned intermediary doctrine is a sound rule because the nature of the
product, prescription drugs, is so complicated that the patient/consumer does not
have enough information to make an informed choice in assessing the risks
associated with a particular drug.30 By placing the doctor between the drug
manufacturer and the patient, the doctor, who knows the patient's individual
symptoms and needs as well as the benefits and risks associated with the drug,
is able to assist the patient in making an informed decision.
Another rationale cited in support of the learned intermediary defense is that
doctors are in a better position to accurately warn patients than drug companies. 2
A warning from the drug manufacturer would have to be unduly complex to

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 151-52 (Mo. 1967)
(citing Sterling Drug,370 F.2d at 85) (holding that the existence of a doctor as a learned

intermediary was reason to require the drug company to warn the doctor of the risks of
its product).
29. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
30. Id. at 1276.
31. Id.
32. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that

a physician decides to prescribe drugs based on "an assessment of medical risks in the
light of the physician's knowledge of his patient's needs and susceptibilities"); Thomas
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 224,229 (N.D. Miss. 1989) ("[Tlhe physician
through education, experience, and specialized training is in the best position to make a
benefit/risk analysis in making the determination to prescribe a particular drug for a

specific patient.").
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cover all the potential risks a patient may have.33 However, a doctor with
knowledge of her patients' specific bodily conditions can make a more accurate
diagnosis.34 Moreover, patients are already protected by the doctor's duty to
procure informed consent from the patient.3" Courts are also concerned that a
warning directly from the drug manufacturer may interfere with the doctorpatient relationship and deter a patient from taking a drug prescribed by her
physician.36
Although the learned intermediary defense enjoys wide acceptance, there
are some exceptions to the doctrine. The two major exceptions to the learned
intermediary defense as it applies to pharmaceutical manufacturers occur when:

(1)mass immunizations are given without the involvement of a physician,"38or
(2) statutory regulations require that drug companies warn patients directly.

Drug manufacturers cannot rely on the learned intermediary doctrine when
their products are distributed in a mass immunization because physicians are not
in a position to adequately warn consumers. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc.," the plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer for failure to warn of the risks
associated with the company's polio vaccine that caused the plaintiff to suffer
paralysis from the waist down.' The Ninth Circuit refused to accept the drug
manufacturer's argument that its warning to the organization that conducted the
mass immunization was sufficient to relieve the manufacturer of a further duty

33. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (arguing
that warnings from drug companies, as opposed to physicians, will be "almost inevitably
involved and longwinded"); Craig A. Marvinney, How Courts Interpret a
Manufacturer'sCommunications to Consumers: The LearnedIntermediaryDoctrine,

47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 69, 73 (1992) (arguing that the complexities of medical jargon
make it almost impossible for pharmaceutical manufacturers to script a warning that the
average consumer can understand).
34. See Barbara Pope Flannagan, ProductsLiability: The Continued Viability of
the LearnedIntermediaryRule as It Applies to Product Warningsfor PrescriptionDrugs,

20 U. RICH. L. REv. 405, 413 (1986) (suggesting that a doctor can both answer patient
questions ard gauge whether the patient understands the nature of the proposed drug
therapy).
35. For an explanation of the doctrine of informed consent and its potential erosion
in modem jurisprudence, see Robert Garter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten
Duty ofPhysicianInquiry, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 557 (2000).

36. See, e.g., Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn.
1977) (noting that "attempts to give detailed warnings to patients could mislead patients
and might also tend to interfere with the physician/patient relationship"); William J.
Curran, PackageInsertsfor Patients: Informed Consent in the 1980s, 305 NEW ENG. J.

MED. 1564 (1981) (arguing that warnings made directly to patients may instill patients
with undue concern and deter them from taking their prescribed medication).
37. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.

39. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 122-25.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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to warn.4' The court reasoned that because the drug was not administered in a
manner that allowed the patient to benefit from a physician's particularized
medical judgment, the drug manufacturer should be held to a duty to directly
warn the patient of the risks associated with its drugs.4
Drug companies are also unable to invoke the learned intermediary defense
when they are required by statute to directly warn patients of the risks associated
with their products. In Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals,3 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court found that a drug manufacturer had a duty to adequately warn a
patient directly because the manufacturer was not entitled to rely on the learned
intermediary doctrine when the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")" had
promulgated regulations requiring a direct warning to patients.4" The plaintiff
in Edwards died from a nicotine overdose after smoking cigarettes while
wearing two nicotine patches manufactured by the defendant.46 Evidence
demonstrated that the drug company warned the patient's prescribing physician

of the possibility of a nicotine-induced heart attack.47 Further, the manufacturer
41. Id. at 130-31.
42. Id..at 131; see also Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977);
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
43. 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997).
44. The recorded decisions finding an exception to the learned intermediary
defense in the face of governmental regulation of consumer warnings have all involved
FDA regulations. For a description of the FDA regulatory scheme regarding prescription
drug warnings, see infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. States can also seek to
regulate prescription drugs. In fact, Missouri has a fairly comprehensive regulatory
scheme. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 196.010-.180 (1994). It is unlikely, however, that
Missouri's regulations may be used as a basis for imputing liability to a drug
manufacturer when the manufacturer is in compliance with FDA regulations because a
state law that has more stringent requirements for pharmaceutical warnings is likely to
be viewed by courts as in conflict with the FDA's expansive regulation of the area, and
thus preempted by federal law. See generally Pharm. Soc'y of N.Y. v. Lefkowitz, 586
F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that a state law that is in actual conflict with the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") will be preempted). The Missouri
legislature has recognized the preemptive force of the FDCA. Section 196.050 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes notes that the Missouri law should not be read to require more
stringent controls than those enumerated by the federal law. Therefore, "if any product
or commodity covered by [the Missouri law] shall comply with the definitions and
standards proscribed by the federal act for such a product or commodity, such product
or commodity shall be deemed in all respects to comply with [the Missouri law]." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 196.050 (1994).
45. See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301. But see Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661
N.E.2d 352, 357 (I11.1996) (refusing to recognize an exception to the learned
intermediary defense in the face of FDA regulations requiring direct-to-consumer
warnings).
46. See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 299.
47. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/10

6

Lear: Lear: Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising
2000]

DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING

1107

complied with the FDA regulations that required the manufacturer to provide a
package insert.' The court held that because the FDA required the manufacturer
to directly warn the consumer, the manufacturer could not invoke the learned
intermediary defense.49 The court further held that the question of whether the
patient insert was sufficient to adequately warn the consumer of the risks
associated with the drug was a question to be decided under state law. Thus,
compliance
with the FDA regulations was not found to be a per se reasonable
50
warning.
A third exception, embodied in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, has
recently developed that could preclude drug manufacturers from relying on the
learned intermediary defense when they have engaged in direct-to-consumer
advertising.
B. Restatement (Third) of Torts, the FDA, and the
Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising Exception
The Restatement (Third) of Torts codifies the common law learned
intermediary doctrine.5' Section 6(d) requires drug manufacturers to give
"reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm" to
physicians or directly to the patients, if the physician will not be in a position to
provide the warning to the patient.5 2 The comment to Section 6(d) recognizes
the arguments recently proffered in opposition to the learned intermediary
defense in the situations where the government has regulated the manufacturer's
duty to warn or when the manufacturer has directly advertised its product to
consumers.5 3 The American Law Institute, however, expressly refrained from
recognizing these arguments as amounting to viable exceptions to the learned

48. Id. at 299-300.
49. Id. at 301.
50. Id. at 303; see also Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 877-78
(E.D. Mich. 1985) (rejecting the defendant's argument that compliance with FDA
regulations should preclude tort liability); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d
65, 70 (Mass. 1985) (holding that compliance with FDA regulations is not conclusive on
the issue of the reasonableness of a drug manufacturer's warning)..
51. Although the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS codifies much of the existing
law in the area of products liability, it does leave some questions open in the area of drug
manufacturers' duty to wam consumers. For instance, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS outlines the instances when a drug manufacturer is obligated to warn patients, but
does not articulate what constitutes a sufficient warning. For further discussion on this
topic, see Jerry J. Phillips, ProductsLiability: Beyond Warnings, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 595,
603-09 (1999) and Justin T. Toth, PrescriptionDrugs and Medical Devices: The
Impending Impact of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Texas, 35 HOus. LAW., Mar.Apr. 1998, at 42-43.
52. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(d)(1)-(2) (1998).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. e (1998).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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intermediary rule, deciding instead to "leave[] to developing case law whether
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule in these or other situations should be
recognized. '"" At least one scholar has argued that the decision by the American
Law Institute to not directly endorse the direct-to-consumer exception to the
learned intermediary rule will cause courts to be reluctant to allow the
exception.55
Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts does not speak to the propriety
of directly advertising drugs to consumers, Congress has addressed this issue in
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 56 In the FDCA, Congress

enacted general requirements for the advertisement of prescription drugs,
including the requirement that advertisements include a true statement of the
drug's "established name,"57 the drug's ingredients, and information on the
drug's side effects.58 Congress also granted the FDA power to "promulgate
.regulations for the efficient enforcement of the [FDCA]." 59 The FDA answered
Congress's charge, at least in the area of drug advertising, by enacting
regulations that detail the requirements for prescription drug advertisements."
With the recent trend of drug manufacturers advertising their products in the
mass media, the direct-to-consumer advertising exception has garnered much
attention from scholars." The basic rationale for the exception is similar to the

54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. e (1998).
55. See Paytash, supranote 23, at 1356.
56. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994).

57. The "established name" of a drug is regulated by 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1994) and
the statute's accompanying regulations are located in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(b)(1)-(2) (1999).
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
60. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1999). The FDA's regulations on prescription drug
advertisements are extensive. For a detailed explanation of the FDA's regulations in this
area, see Lars Noah, Advertising PrescriptionDrugs to Consumers: Assessing the
Regulatory andLiability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141 (1997). Violation of the FDCA, or
its accompanying regulations, is deemed to be a "false advertisement" under the Federal
Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"). 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (1994) (noting that violations of
the section's provisions will "be subject to the provisions of sections 52 to 57 of Title
15"). "False advertisement" under the FTCA is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
not more than $5,000 and/or not more than six months imprisonment. 15 U.S.C. § 54(a)
(1994). A violation may also prompt a civil action brought by the Federal Trade
Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (1994). Though some may argue that these
penalties are sufficient to deter drug manufacturers from falsely advertising, Congress
intended consumers to be able to individually seek reparations as well. See 15 U.S.C. §
57b(e) (1994) ("Remedies provided [by the FTCA] are in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.").
61. See, e.g., Tim S. Hall, Bypassing the LearnedInternediary: PotentialLiability
for Failureto Warn in Direct-to-ConsumerPrescriptionDrugAdvertising, 2 CORNELL
J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 449 (1993); Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jerrerson, "[S]ome [A]ccurate
[JInformationis [Bjetter than [N]o [I]nformation[A]t [A]ll": Arguments Against an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/10
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rationale behind the exceptions regarding mass immunizations and statutory
regulations.62 In all three instances, there is reason to believe that the doctorpatient relationship, on which the learned intermediary theory is grounded, is not
sufficient to protect the patient/consumer. The basic argument for the direct-toconsumer advertising exception is that the autonomy of the physician in the drug
prescription process is undermined by the drug manufacturers' advertisements.63
One purpose of advertising prescription drugs in the mass media is to encourage
potential consumers to approach their physicians and request a prescription for
the advertised drug. This situation seems to unseat the decision-making balance
between the doctor and patient, where the doctor was previously viewed as a
gate-keeper, protecting the patient from potential harm. When the patient is the
party requesting a particular drug, the doctor would be seen as nothing more than
an intermediary between the drug company and the consumer. However, despite
the rationale behind the direct-to-consumer exception, courts have not been
receptive to adopting it."
While most courts have not been receptive to the direct-to-consumer
advertising exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, some courts have
65
recognized the exception. In Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., the United States

District Court, applying Michigan law,66 held that manufacturers of oral

Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Based on Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising, 78 OR. L. REv. 605 (1999); Jack E. Karns, Direct Advertising of
PrescriptionDrugs: The Duty to Warn and the Learned IntermediaryRule, 3 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 273 (2000); Joel Slawotsky, The Learned IntermediaryDoctrine:
The Employer as Intermediary,30 TORT & INS. L.J. 1059 (1995).
62. See Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the
Effect ofDirect-to-ConsumerPharmaceuticalAdvertising on the LearnedIntermediary
Doctrine,20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 113, 123-24 (1997).
63. See Paytash, supranote 23, at 1355.
64. See Paytash, supranote 23, at 1355-56.
65. 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985); see also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d

1064, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that manufacturers of contraceptives are required
to warn the consumers of their products based, in part, on the fact that they directly
advertise the product to consumers); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211
n.4 (D. Mass. 1991) (recognizing the validity of the direct-to-consumer advertising
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine), rev'd on othergrounds, 976 F.2d 77 (1st

Cir. 1992). But see Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 1989)
(holding that there is no exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in direct-toconsumer advertising cases because doctors are still in a position to exercise individual
medical judgment).
66. In Graingerv. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,358 N.W.2d 873, 874 (Mich. 1984),

the Michigan Supreme Court chose not to rule whether the learned intermediary doctrine
contained an exception for direct-to-consumer advertising, holding that it was a question

for the legislature. Three judges dissented from the opinion, advocating that the court
should have ruled on the issue and recognized a direct-to-consumer advertising exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine. Id. at 878-79. The district court in Stephens relied
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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contraceptives have a duty to directly warn consumers of the risks associated
with their products.' The court noted that drug companies are usually protected
by the learned intermediary doctrine, but found that an exception in the case of
oral contraceptives was needed because of the marketing practices employed by
the drug manufacturers.68 The district court noted, "As a result of [the drug
manufacturers' marketing practices'], patients eager to take the pill have
specifically requested it as the most effective means of preventing unwanted
pregnancies, and doctors have responded to these requests by prescribing it."69
In Perez v. Wyeth LaboratoriesInc.,70 the New Jersey Supreme Court held

that a manufacturer of a contraceptive implant system was not entitled to rely on
the learned intermediary defense when the manufacturer engaged in direct
marketing of the product to consumers. 7' The court explained:
[W]hen mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a
patient's choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes
direct claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product should not be
unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper warnings of the
dangers or side effects of the product.72
The New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision to make an exception to
the learned intermediary defense on the ground that direct marketing of
prescription drugs undermines the rationale behind the learned intermediary
rule.73 The court recognized that the basic rationales behind the learned
intermediary rule are "(1) reluctance to undermine the doctor-patient
relationship; (2) absence in the era of 'doctor knows best' of [the] need for the
patient's informed consent; (3) inability of drug manufacturer[s] to communicate
with patients; and (4) complexity of the subject .... Furthermore, the court
noted that these justifications were no longer compelling. 75 First, the traditional
doctor-patient relationship, which was characterized by the doctor's paternalistic
decision-making authority, has given way to an approach that, through the
doctrine of informed consent, emphasizes the patient's decision-making
authority.76 The court also noted that "because managed care has reduced the
entirely on the dissenting opinion in Graingerto determine what Michigan law was on
this issue. See Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380-81.
67. See Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 381.
68. Id. at 380.
69. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Grainger,358 N.W.2d at 884-85).

70. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
71. Id. at 1263.
72. Id. at 1247.
73. Id. at 1255.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/10
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time allotted per patient, physicians have considerably less time to inform
patients of the risks and benefits of a drug."77 Further, the court recognized that
drug companies do have the means to successfully communicate with patients,
a fact evidenced by the companies' ability to launch successful advertising
campaigns. 78 For these reasons, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that drug
manufacturers cannot rely on the learned intermediary defense when they engage
in direct-to-consumer advertising of their products.79
C. Learned IntermediaryDoctrinein Missouri
The first case in Missouri to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to a
products liability action against a drug manufacturer was Krug v. SterlingDrug,
Inc.80 In Krug, the plaintiff took a drug called chloroquine prescribed by her
doctor to treat discoid lupus eryhematosus. 8" Krug later developed a condition
called chloroquine retinopathy, which results in the gradual onset of blindness.8 2

This ailment is a side-effect of chloroquine.83 Krug's doctor wrote a letter to
Sterling Drug, the manufacturer of chloroquine, inquiring whether the sideeffects his patient was experiencing were the result of her taking chloroquine. s
Sterling Drug replied that eyesight impairment was a side-effect of chloroquine,
but that there had not been any evidence that the effect was irreversible.8" When
Krug subsequently brought suit against Sterling Drug, the Missouri Supreme
Court, instituting the learned intermediary rule, stated:
'There is no question of intervening proximate cause in this case. The
sole issue was whether appellant negligently failed to make reasonable
efforts to warn appellee's doctors. If appellant did so fail, it is liable
regardless of anything the doctors may or may not have done. If it did
not so fail, then it is not liable for appellee's injury.' 6
This statement of the learned intermediary doctrine left unanswered the question
whether the drug manufacturer has a duty to warn a physician when the
physician has independent knowledge of the risks associated with the
manufacturer's drug. This question, in actuality a proximate cause issue, was
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150-51.

86. Id. at 151 (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir.

1966)).
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resolved in favor of drug manufacturers by the Missouri Supreme Court in
87
Callahanv. CardinalGlennon Hospital.
Callahaninvolved a medical malpractice claim brought against Cardinal
Glennon Hospital for the negligent acts of one of its doctors.8 In explaining the
extent of causation necessary to substantiate a finding of liability, the court noted
that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the defendant were the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. 9 The court explained this rule by noting
that if a doctor had independent knowledge of information that could have been
used to prevent the patient's injury, then a failure to warn by the nurse or a
pharmaceutical company could not be the proximate cause of the patient's
injuries.9"
Subsequent cases have extended the learned intermediary doctrine to apply
to medical devices in liability cases. For example, in Kirsch v. Picker
International,Inc., the Eight Circuit, applying Missouri law, held that a
company that produces X-ray equipment was protected by the learned
intermediary defense and was only obligated to warn the physician of the risks
associated with its product.' The court reasoned that because the company's Xray equipment was only sold to qualified professionals and not to the general
public, the manufacturer was entitled to rely on the doctor to warn the patients
of the risks associated with use of the equipment.93

87. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993).
88. Id. at 857.
89. Id. at 862.
90. Id.; see also Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 193-94 (Mo.
1992) (holding that, infailure to warn cases, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the manufacturer's failure to warn was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries).
But see Beer v. Upjohn Co., 943 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the
testimony of the prescribing physician that a warning by the drug manufacturer would
probably not have changed his decision to prescribe the drug was not sufficient to entitle
the drug company to a directed verdict because the court could not "conclude as a matter
of law that a more positive or forceful warning would not have affected [the doctor's]
treatment of [the patient]").
91. 753 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1985).

92. Id. at 671.
93. Id. Missouri courts, however, have been reluctant to extend the learned
intermediary defense to manufactures of non-medical products. See Menschik v. MidAmerica Pipeline Co., 812 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In Menschik, the court held
that the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply outside the medical context to a
bulk supplier of gas, noting:
Missouri courts have developed another exception, known as the 'learned
intermediary' doctrine, for the special case involving a drug manufacturer that
supplies prescription drugs to a doctor, who then prescribes them to a
patient[.] The rationale for that exception, that a patient may obtain the
product only through a qualified professional who presumably will explain
the dangers of the product to the patient, cannot sensibly be stretched to apply
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/10
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IV. INSTANT DECISION

On appeal, the plaintiffs in Alpha Therapeuticcontended that the trial court
erred in submitting instructions to the jury on the learned intermediary doctrine.94
The plaintiffs argued that the learned intermediary instructions were not proper
because Alpha Therapeutic engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising, which
triggered an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, thus precluding the
defense.9' The plaintiffs also argued that because of the erroneous advertising
sent to them, the trial court erred in not giving an instruction to the jury that
outlined Alpha Therapeutic's duty to warn the plaintiffs' doctors.96 Finally, the
plaintiffs argued that the learned
intermediary doctrine was generally not a viable
97
defense under Missouri law.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri noted
that in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make specific
objections to a jury instruction either in the jury instruction conference or in a
motion for new trial.9" At trial, the plaintiffs did not object to the language of the
jury instructions on the learned intermediary doctrine, nor did the plaintiffs ask
for an instruction on the direct-to-consumer advertising exception." The only
timely objection made to the jury instructions at issue was made in the plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial, where the plaintiffs argued that the instruction was
improper because the doctrine of learned intermediary was not a viable defense
in Missouri.'0 0 Because the only objection that the plaintiffs made at trial was
that the learned intermediary doctrine was not an affirmative defense in
Missouri, the only issues before the appellate court were whether the instruction
was in accord with Missouri law and whether there was sufficient evidence to
support submitting the instruction to the jury."'
The court held that the learned intermediary doctrine is a viable defense in
Missouri." The court noted that the duty of a drug manufacturer is "'to
properly warn the doctor of the dangers involved and it is incumbent upon the

to this case. Whatever else [the pipeline company] may be, it is not a 'learned
intermediary' within the meaning of the Missouri doctrine.
Id. at 864 (quoting Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 n.9 (8th Cir.
1989)).

94. See Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404,419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
For the text of one of the instructions at issue, see supra note 19.
95. Alpha Therapeutic,3 S.W.3d at 419. For a description of Alpha Therapeutic's
direct-to-consumer advertising, see supratext accompanying notes 6-7.
96. Alpha Therapeutic,3 S.W.3d at 419.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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manufacturer to bring the warning home to the doctor."'"0 3 The manufacturer's
duty to warn is discharged when it provides the physician with information
regarding the risks of its products.'°4 Further, if the prescribing physician had
independent knowledge of the risks of the product, the failure of a drug
manufacturer's warning would do nothing to improve the patient's position as
the doctor already had the information and failed to warn the patient.' 5
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to
support the submission of the instruction on the learned intermediary defense to
the jury.'" The court pointed to evidence that the plaintiffs' treating physicians
went to great lengths to educate themselves about the AIDS crisis.'0 7 The
plaintiffs' physicians testified that they relied principally on research that was
being conducted by the Center for Disease Control and not on the literature
provided by Alpha Therapeutic.' 8 And while they were at least somewhat
aware of the risks associated with Factor VIII, the physicians decided to keep
their patients on Factor VIII treatment.' 9 Because the learned intermediary
doctrine was supported by Missouri law and there was evidence that the
plaintiffs' treating physicians had substantially the same knowledge as Alpha
Therapeutic regarding the risks of contracting AIDS through the use of blood
products, the court held that the instructions on the learned intermediary doctrine
were proper." 0 The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's decision to instruct
the jury on the learned intermediary defense."'
V. COMMENT
Missouri, to date, has not recognized the direct-to-consumer advertising
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. This issue was raised in Alpha
Therapeutic,but was dismissed because of a procedural error by the plaintiffs'
counsel." 2 Although this exception has not been widely adopted by courts, it is

103.
1967)).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. (quoting Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. Ct. App.
Id.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 421.

111. Id.

112. See supratext accompanying notes 98-101. This issue was again raised in
Doe v. Miles, Inc., No. ED 75100, 2000 WL 667383 (Mo. Ct. App. May 23, 2000). The
facts in Miles are very similar to those in Alpha Therapeutic. The plaintiff in Miles

alleged that a company that manufactured blood products for the treatment of hemophilia
had a duty to directly warn patients, because the company, in a newsletter to consumers,
made alleged misrepresentations about the safety of its product. Id. at *17. The trial
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/10
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well supported by public policy considerations and should be adopted in
Missouri. Without the exception, drug manufacturers can hide behind the
learned intermediary doctrine and continue to present information regarding the
benefits of their products without being required to inform the consumer of the
risks.
It is true that the FDA has adopted regulations to oversee direct-toconsumer drug advertising." 3 However, the regulations only provide a limited
scheme of penalties and do not provide victims of drug manufacturers' failure
to warn with any process for reparations." 4 Further, Congress intended the FDA
regulations to be a supplement to common law actions, not an alternative to
them."5 However, without the direct-to-consumer advertising exception to the

learned intermediary doctrine, a plaintiff harmed by a drug who relied on the
advertising provided by the drug's manufacturer cannot recover damages
because the responsibility to warn rests on physicians. This result is irrational
in light of the justifications for the learned intermediary defense.
Many commentators, in arguing against revising the learned intermediary
doctrine, rely on the primary rationale behind the rule." 6 Courts and
commentators continue to find compelling the argument that doctors are in a
better position than drug companies to warn consumers of the risks associated
with prescriptions drugs." 7 One reason that doctors are viewed as better
conduits of information than drug companies is that prescription drugs, and the
risks associated with them, are so complicated that patients need doctors to
provide them with a particularized warning."' This argument, however, is
rebutted by the actions of drug companies in directly marketing their products
to consumers.
By engaging in direct-to-consumer advertising, drug
manufacturers are implicitly admitting that consumers can understand how a
prescription drug will benefit them.' 9 If consumers are able to understand the
benefits of a prescription drug, then certainly, they are capable of understanding
the associated risks.
Further, the direct-to-consumer advertising exception is a limited exception
to the otherwise sound learned intermediary rule. The exception recognizes the
inherent inconsistency of the policy justifications for the learned intermediary

court held that because the plaintiff did not actually read the newsletter provided by the
drug manufacturer, she was not entitled to argue for the direct-to-consumer advertisement
exception to the learned intermediary rule. Id. The court, therefore, refused to rule
whether such an exception is cognizable under Missouri law. Id.
113. See supranote 60 and accompanying text.
114. See supranotes 60-64 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 60.
116. See supratext accompanying notes 29-3 1.
117. See supratext accompanying notes 29-31.
118. See supratext accompanying notes 29-31.
119. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999); Noah, supra
note 60, at 157-59.
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rule when applied in the context of directly marketed drugs. The exception,
therefore, should not have an undue chilling effect on the development of
prescription drugs, because the exception is limited to those instances when
manufacturers directly market their drugs to consumers. If the risks associated
with a particular prescription drug are too complicated for manufacturers to
effectively explain directly to consumers, then courts should recognize that it is
negligent to directly advertise that drug to consumers.
Courts also adhere to the view that the traditional doctor-patient relationship
continues to justify the learned intermediary rule. 2 ° Recent trends in the medical
profession, including the rise of managed care and the direct marketing of
medical services, have undermined this rationale.' 2' Medicine is a less personal
industry than it was forty years ago when the learned intermediary rule was first
announced. Patients are now expected to take a more active role in their own
health care decisions. Further, the exponential growth of medical technology,
including prescription drug development, calls into question the ability of
doctors to educate themselves about all of the potential drugs their patients may
request or require." Drug manufacturers have recognized this problem and
have sought to directly educate the public about their products. Because the
purpose of direct-to-consumer advertising is to remove the physician as the sole
source of treatment information, drug manufacturers who utilize these methods
should be responsible, just as physicians are, for informing the patient/consumer
of the risks associated with their recommendations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the learned intermediary doctrine is based on sound public policy,
Missouri courts must recognize that, as with all common law concepts, this
doctrine must be revised to meet the changing face of the market in which it
operates. The advent of direct-to-consumer advertising by drug manufacturers
has caused a need for a revision of the learned intermediary doctrine. Missouri
courts should not apply the learned intermediary defense on behalf of a drug
company when the company has sought to influence the doctor-patient treatment

120. See supranote 36.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
122. "'In a 1997 survey of 1,000 patients, the F.D.A. found that only one-third had
received information from their doctors about the dangerous side effects of drugs they
were taking."' Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (quoting Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty Warning

Labels Add to Risk in PrescriptionDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27).
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decision with commercial advertising. Continuing to apply the learned
intermediary defense in the face of direct-to-consumer advertising of drug
products will result in a violation of the very policy justifications on which the
rule is based.
BRADFORD B. LEAR
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